Why do some countries become drug trafficking hubs – and others don’t?

Phillip Screen, a researcher at Transcrime, completed his International Ph.D. in Criminology at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in February 2026. In this blog post, he presents the main findings of his doctoral thesis:
“Why some and not others? Challenging traditional narratives in understanding drug trafficking flows and transhipment countries”

“Drug trafficking is often described as a simple supply chain. Cocaine is produced mainly in the Andes, heroin in Central and Southeast Asia, and the drugs are consumed in wealthy markets such as Europe, North America, and Australia. But the routes between these regions are far from random. Some countries become key transit points while others are bypassed. My PhD asked a simple but surprisingly under-studied question: why are some countries used for trafficking routes while others are not?

Most existing research focuses on where drugs move, mapping routes and seizures. Far less work has examined why those routes exist in the first place. The dominant explanation in the literature is risk: traffickers are assumed to avoid places with strong law enforcement and strict border controls. In theory, drugs should move through weak or failed states where enforcement is limited.

However, when we look at real trafficking routes, this explanation does not fully fit the evidence. Major trafficking hubs often appear in countries with strong institutions (places like the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, the United States, and Australia). My research investigated why this happens.

To study this question, I used social network analysis, a method that examines relationships between actors. In this case, the actors were countries, and the relationships were drug trafficking flows between them. I built global networks of cocaine and heroin trafficking covering the period 2007–2015, combining two international data sources to map how drugs move across borders.

The analysis examined three types of explanations commonly used in criminology.

1. Interdiction risk: whether traffickers avoid places where they are more likely to be caught.
2. Social connections: migration, tourism, and other ties that help traffickers move goods through trusted networks.
3. Institutional conditions, such as the strength and stability of governance within a country.

The results were surprising. Traditional risk measures, such as enforcement or seizure activity, played a much smaller role than often assumed. Instead, trafficking flows were strongly shaped by social connections between countries, geographical distance, and the rule of law.

Even more striking was the finding related to transhipment countries – the states that sit in the middle of trafficking routes. The study found that countries with stronger institutions were more likely to become trafficking hubs, not less. Weak governance was associated more with production and export, while stable, well-governed countries often became key transit points or destinations.

Why would criminal organisations use strong states rather than weak ones? One explanation is stability. Weak states may have less enforcement, but they also have unpredictable governance, violence, and unstable institutions. From the perspective of organised crime, these conditions create uncertainty. Strong states, by contrast, provide reliable infrastructure, functioning logistics systems, and predictable institutions. Enforcement risks can often be offset through higher profits, but instability is much harder to manage.

In other words, traffickers may operate in a way that resembles investors in financial markets. They weigh expected profits, operational risks, and market stability when deciding where to operate. Countries with stable institutions can therefore become attractive nodes in global cocaine and heroin trafficking networks, even when enforcement is strong.

Another key finding is that countries do not have fixed roles in drug trafficking. The traditional categories (source, transit, and destination) suggest a static supply chain. In reality, many countries perform multiple roles simultaneously, and these roles change over time as routes adapt to new conditions.

Overall, the research challenges a common assumption in policy discussions: that strengthening institutions alone will push trafficking away. The evidence suggests a more complex reality. Stable institutions may reduce certain forms of crime, but they can also create opportunities for organised crime networks to operate efficiently within global markets.

Understanding these dynamics is important for policymakers. Drug trafficking is not simply about avoiding law enforcement. It is about navigating global systems of trade, infrastructure, and social connections. To disrupt these networks effectively, responses need to consider not only enforcement risk, but also the structural opportunities that make certain countries attractive in the first place”.